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Abstract
Th e refugee status determination (RSD) process in Canada, 
like the RSD processes of other states, currently rejects one 
in fi ft een refugee claims based upon the non-compliance of 
refugee claimants with the rules of the process. Most com-
monly this is due to a claimant’s failure to provide requested 
information or his or her failure to attend a scheduled 
hearing. Th ese “abandonment” decisions result in the ex-
pedited removal of claimants without access to further re-
view. Despite the drastic consequences of such decisions, the 
framework within which they are made neither has been 
comprehensively outlined nor has its application been cata-
logued, which is the aim of this paper. It argues that while 
the formal provisions of the domestic framework are both 
inconsistent with international law and in excess of the dele-
gated authority through which it is constructed, the Court’s 
application of the framework has been generous to refugee 
claimants.
Résumé
Le processus de détermination du statut de réfugié (DSR) au 
Canada, tout comme les processus de DSR d’autres états, re-
jette actuellement une revendication du statut de réfugié sur 
quinze, basé sur le non-respect des règlements du processus 
par les demandeurs du statut de réfugié. Le plus souvent, la 
raison est qu’un demandeur n’a pas soumis les informations 
demandées, ou ne s’est pas présenté à une audience régulière. 
Ces décisions pour « abandon » donnent lieu à un processus 
accéléré de renvoi des demandeurs sans accès supplémen-
taire à un réexamen. Malgré les conséquences drastiques de 
telles décisions, le cadre dans lequel elles sont faites n’a pas 
été suffi  samment élaboré dans tous ses détails, ni leur appli-
cation cataloguée, ce qui est l’objectif de cet article.
The most likely outcome of a refugee claim in Canada is acceptance. However, another highly possible out-come is abandonment. In the fi rst half of 2008, out 
of a total of 8,311 decisions made in refugee claims, 535 (or 
6 per cent) were decisions to declare a refugee claim to have 
been abandoned.1 In some offi  ces of the Immigration and 
Refugee Board (the Board), abandonment decisions account 
for one-tenth of decisions rendered.2 Abandonment can be 
the outcome of an even larger percentage of refugee claims 
in Canada from certain countries of origin.3 Even countries 
of origin with very high rates of acceptance can be plagued 
by signifi cant numbers (both absolutely and relatively) of 
abandoned refugee claims. Furthermore, the issue of aban-
donment is not particular to Canada. In recent years in the 
United Kingdom refusals because of “non-compliance” have 
accounted for a similar proportion of decisions rendered.4 In 
2008, the practice of Greece in declaring as “interrupted” very 
large numbers of cases attracted condemnation by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).5
It has been suggested that these high rates of abandonment 
decisions raise concerns regarding the population of refugee 
claimants in Canada (and elsewhere). Th ese concerns have 
commonly prompted the draft ing of provisions allowing for 
the expedited removal of individuals who abandon their re-
quests for asylum. Such provisions simply raise the ante for 
the refugee claimant and underscore the potentially catas-
trophic consequences of an abandonment decision. Yet de-
spite accounting for a sizable percentage of refugee claim 
outcomes, the law governing the abandonment of refugee 
claims in Canada (and elsewhere) has not been the object 
of study. Th e purpose of this paper is to explore the legal 
frameworks which govern the manner in which these refu-
gee claimants are dealt with by the administrative tribunals 
and courts of Canada charged with deciding their cases. Th e 
non-compliance of such claimants with the administrative 
machinery used to determine their worthiness for protection 
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poses a conundrum: to what extent is compliance with the 
procedures of the country of asylum required in order to be 
entitled to its protection?
Th e answer to this question must be discerned within the 
bounds of the legal frameworks governing abandonment de-
cisions, both international and domestic. Th e latter largely 
restrict abandonment decisions to situations where a claim-
ant has failed to provide required information or to attend 
his or her hearing before the decision maker. Unfortunately, 
in determining whether either of these circumstances has oc-
curred the latter domestic framework in signifi cant ways is 
inconsistent with Canada’s international obligations and its 
own schema of delegated authority. However, while the judi-
ciary have failed to explicitly address these failings in the do-
mestic frameworks, their decisions have read into the frame-
work a requirement of intention that in many ways implicitly 
addresses the gaps of the domestic framework. To answer 
the question posed earlier, compliance with the procedures 
of the country of asylum is only required insofar as it is an 
indication of a continuous intention to seek the protection 
of Canada.
Th is article will begin by outlining the legal framework 
which governs decisions to abandon refugee claims. Th ere 
are both international law and international practice that are 
relevant to determining the proper process that should be 
followed. In addition, Canada’s legislation governing refu-
gee protection, and its delegated legislation, provide limits 
on the reasons for and methods through which a claim can 
be declared abandoned. Aft er establishing and critiquing 
the legal framework, the article will review its application 
by Canadian tribunals with a view to indicating the specifi c 
defi ciencies in the legal framework that the jurisprudence 
has fi lled.
Legal Framework
As a term, “refugee status determination” (RSD) is somewhat 
misleading; the process of RSD does not “fi x conclusively or 
authoritatively” (determine) the status of a refugee claimant. 
At international law, it is well established that refugee status 
exists before any status determination conducted by a state 
party to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (the 
Refugee Convention)6 or the offi  ce of the UNHCR.7 RSD, 
through its process of gathering and interrogating informa-
tion about the refugee claimant’s situation in his or her coun-
try of origin, simply “recognizes” the pre-existing and in-
dependent status (or lack thereof) of the claimant. Logically 
then the status of an individual at international law persists 
regardless of whether a state or UNHCR in fact recognizes 
the “true” status of the claimant—or for that matter whether 
or not the refugee assists the state in recognizing his or her 
true status.
And yet the pragmatic task of managing migration re-
quires that the status of a person be known to the state. RSD 
exists in domestic law to allow a state’s immigration bureau-
cracy to label a particular individual seeking protection as 
either “legitimate” (refugee) or “illegitimate” (non-refugee) 
and to thereby grant him or her access to (or refuse access to) 
various benefi ts accruing from that status. As the process typ-
ically unfolds, a refugee claimant’s status is adjudicated based 
upon information gathered by state agents largely through 
documentary sources, written statements, and oral state-
ments given during interviews and hearings. In Canada, this 
function is performed by the Refugee Protection Division 
(the RPD) of the Immigration and Refugee Board.8 Th e 
nuance of a non-complaint but nonetheless bona fi de refugee 
is lost in the functionalism of this process.
Th e legal framework that governs the decision making 
of the RPD is necessarily a parochial one, that of domestic 
law. But Canadian law requires that this framework be in-
terpreted, as much as possible (and especially where there is 
silence), in keeping with Canada’s international legal obliga-
tions. It is for this reason that the guidance of the latter will 
be outlined, including international practice, below before 
proceeding to a more detailed analysis of the domestic legal 
provisions.
International Legal Framework
International law, as a principal source of Canada’s obliga-
tion to off er protection to refugee claimants, provides a 
framework within which abandonment decisions must be 
made. While international treaties are not formally a part of 
Canadian law unless implemented by statute,9 the values re-
fl ected in international human rights law “may help inform 
the contextual approach to statutory interpretation and judi-
cial review.”10 International instruments and practices will be 
discussed below insofar as they relate to the right to asylum, 
the right to due process, the norms of refugee determination, 
and other considerations. While not explicitly addressing 
the topic of abandonment of refugee claims, international 
law will be shown to strongly suggest that any decision to 
abandon should be made with sensitivity to the claimant’s 
situation, with caution and only aft er full procedural rights 
have been accorded a claimant. International instruments 
and customs with respect to refugee determination and other 
civil proceedings will be shown to require a fair hearing with 
the claimant being given a reasonable opportunity to retain 
counsel and an interpreter before any decision with respect 
to abandonment is made.
Th e right to asylum11 is guaranteed in numerous inter-
national declarations, agreements, and treaties.12 Th e most 
comprehensive assessment of asylum, otherwise known as 
refugee protection, is provided by the Refugee Convention 
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(and the Protocol Relating to the Protection of Refugees13 [the 
Protocol] of 1967). Unfortunately, although not surprising-
ly, neither of these international agreements deals with the 
procedures by which a refugee claim should be made or de-
termined.14 Consequently, concerning the issue of abandon-
ment both treaties are silent.15
Both these international treaties accept that the right to 
asylum is not without obligation on the claimant. Article 2 of 
the Refugee Convention requires that a refugee claimant con-
form to the laws and regulations in the country of asylum (al-
though it provides no explicit consequences for those claim-
ants who fail to so conform). Article 31 predicates relief from 
prosecution for unlawful entry upon a refugee presenting 
himself or herself without delay to the authorities and show-
ing good cause for his or her illegal entry. Numerous of the 
socio-economic rights provided to refugees in the Refugee 
Convention are provided only to refugees “lawfully” present, 
staying or residing.16 Notwithstanding these provisions, the 
Refugee Convention’s treatment of non-refoulement and ex-
pulsion (with respect to bona fi de refugees17) states that only 
the most serious and criminal breaches of domestic law will 
allow for expulsion or forced return.18
While the Refugee Convention and the Protocol may be 
silent on the proper procedures by which refugee status 
is determined (and thus through which claims are aban-
doned), the UNHCR has issued guidelines. Canadian courts 
have given weight to the pronouncements of UNHCR, and 
have, in particular, accepted the importance of the UNHCR 
Handbook: “[it ]must be treated as a highly relevant authority 
in considering refugee admission practices.”19 Th e UNHCR 
Handbook states (at paragraph 190) that any decisions re-
garding refugees should be made in the context of their dis-
advantaged situation:
It should be recalled that an applicant for refugee status is nor-
mally in a particularly vulnerable situation. He fi nds himself in 
an alien environment and may experience serious diffi  culties, 
technical and psychological, in submitting his case to the au-
thorities of a foreign country, oft en in a language not his own. 
His application should therefore be examined within the frame-
work of specially established procedures by qualifi ed personnel 
having the necessary knowledge and experience, and an under-
standing of an applicant’s particular diffi  culties and needs.
Furthermore, UNHCR has declared in the Handbook that 
a claimant “should receive the necessary guidance as to the 
procedure to be followed” and that a refugee determination 
authority must understand that a claimant may “still feel ap-
prehensive vis-à-vis any authority.”20 In addition, in com-
menting on developments in asylum procedures, UNHCR 
has emphasized that the principle of fairness shall be not 
superseded by the goal of effi  ciency.21 Th us it would appear 
that abandonment, like any other determination of a refugee 
claim, should occur only aft er a decision maker has ensured 
that the claimant has received adequate guidance and assist-
ance.
Numerous international human rights treaties provide in-
sight into the striking of a balance between “fairness” and 
“effi  ciency” that is necessary in any administrative process. 
Decisions that aff ect an individual’s legal rights or civil status 
are generally required by international law to comply with a 
particular balance of fairness and effi  ciency: such decisions 
must meet the standards of due process. For example, Article 
14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) provides an overarching right to all those facing 
“a determination of … his rights and obligations in a suit at 
law” to “a fair and public hearing by a competent, independ-
ent and impartial tribunal established by law.” Unfortunately, 
the minimum standards prescribed by the ICCPR (and also 
dealt with by Canada in its periodic reports to the treaty 
monitoring body22) only explicitly apply to criminal trials. 
Some jurisprudence suggests that Article 14 of the ICCPR 
does not apply to immigration proceedings.23 However, even 
if Article 14 does not apply, Article 13 guarantees that ex-
pulsion will only occur lawfully “in pursuance of a decision 
reached in accordance with law” and only aft er the individual 
concerned has been allowed “to submit the reasons against 
his expulsion” to a competent independent authority.24 Th us, 
the ICCPR guarantees a hearing, or at a minimum the right 
to make submissions on the topic.25
While the international treaties may not explicitly defi ne 
the elements of what constitutes a “fair hearing” in refugee 
determination in general or abandonment decisions in par-
ticular, the ultimate consequence of these decisions suggests 
that a high standard of due process is required:
Most of the countries examined in this paper [comparing ref-
uge determination regimes] do not have the death penalty. Yet 
for a refugee wrongly rejected and returned to the country from 
which he has fl ed, death may be the result. Th e potential conse-
quences of an error in refugee determination require the high-
est standards for the determination systems. However, none of 
the systems comes close to the protection off ered to an accused 
criminal, where the potential harm from error is a good deal 
less.26
Th e analogy of due process guarantees in refugee deter-
mination systems and capital trials is apt.27 In the context of 
administering the death penalty case (when consular access 
rights were violated) the Inter-American Court has held as 
follows with respect to due process:
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It is obvious that the obligation to observe the right to informa-
tion becomes all the more imperative here, given the exception-
ally grave and irreparable nature of the penalty that one sen-
tenced to death could receive. If the due process of law, with 
all its rights and guarantees, must be respected regardless of the 
circumstances, then its observance becomes all the more im-
portant when that supreme entitlement that every human rights 
treaty and declaration recognizes and protects is at stake: human 
life.
Because execution of the death penalty is irreversible, the strict-
est and most rigorous enforcement of judicial guarantees is re-
quired of the State so that those guarantees are not violated and 
a human life not arbitrarily taken as a result.28
Th is logic applies equally to the nature of an abandon-
ment decision and its consequences which, aft er the removal 
of the claimant, is eff ectively irreversible and which is pot-
entially the cause of inestimable harm to a bona fi de refugee. 
Pursuing this logic, the Federal Court frequently has con-
sidered the potentially dire consequences of abandonment 
in assessing the fairness of the decision.29 Th us, in addition 
to requiring a hearing, international law requires that any 
abandonment process provide the claimant with procedural 
rights—and that these rights be rigorously enforced.
Particular Refugee Determination Guidelines
While there is no universally accepted system of refugee 
determination, procedural rights aff orded refuge claimants 
in other refugee determination systems may provide guid-
ance about generally accepted notions of procedural rights 
in the context of refugee determination. As noted in the 
Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Rahaman,30 Canadian 
courts should look to accepted international norms when 
interpreting aspects of the Refugee Convention which are un-
defi ned.31
As noted earlier, the UNHCR, through its Handbook, has 
provided some general guidance on general refugee deter-
mination procedures. In addition, the Executive Committee 
(ExCom) of UNHCR has adopted a resolution32 requiring a 
refugee determination process to include, among other ele-
ments, (i) the provision of guidance to the refugee claimant 
as to the procedure to be followed, (ii) the provision of the 
necessary facilities, including the services of a competent 
interpreter, for submitting his case to the authorities con-
cerned, and (iii) the opportunity for a refugee claimant, of 
which they should be duly informed, to contact a representa-
tive of UNHCR. UNHCR’s own refugee status guidelines for 
its own decision makers require it not to abandon (close) a 
refugee claim unless the decision maker loses contact with a 
claimant for more than six weeks following the scheduling of 
an interview.33 Even where cases are “closed,” requests for a 
“re-opening” of the claim should “generally be granted.”34
Th e Council of Europe has adopted a general framework 
of substantive and procedural rights which give substance 
to the prescription against the refoulement of refugees. Th e 
Council’s Resolution on Minimum Guarantees for Asylum 
Procedures35 states, in part, as follows:
13. Asylum-seekers must be informed of the proced-1. 
ure to be followed and of their rights and obligations 
during the procedure, in a language which they can 
understand. In particular:
– they must be given the services of an interpreter, 2. 
whenever necessary, for submitting their case to the 
authorities concerned. Th ese services must be paid 
for out of public funds, if the interpreter is called 
upon by the competent authorities,
– in accordance with the rules of the Member State 3. 
concerned, they may call in a legal adviser or other 
counselor to assist them during the procedure,
…4. 
14. Before a fi nal decision is taken on the asylum 5. 
application, the asylum-seeker must be given the 
opportunity of a personal interview with an offi  cial 
qualifi ed under national law.
Th e European Union’s binding minimum procedural 
standards also require a hearing in most cases.36 Exceptions 
to this provision are permitted only where the decision is 
positive,37 where there has been a prior interview of some 
kind,38 or where evidence already provided by the refugee 
claimant indicates that the claim is manifestly unfounded.39 
Even where a decision is made to abandon a refugee claim 
due to the failure of a refugee to attend an interview, the EU 
Procedural Directive allows for the right of reopening where 
good cause for non-attendance is shown.40
Th us the right to a hearing is not only required by inter-
national law, but also customarily accorded in other refu-
gee determination systems. Furthermore, applying both the 
UNHCR and European frameworks, an abandonment deci-
sion should not be made before a claimant has been accorded 
a reasonable opportunity to retain legal counsel and the ser-
vices of an interpreter (if required). Th e right to counsel and 
an interpreter is a right that predates a hearing and it is a 
right that persists throughout the determination procedure. 
Where a claim is abandoned, a refugee claimant should have 
the ability to reopen his or her claim upon establishing good 
cause for the abandonment. As will be seen below, Canadian 
law frequently fails to provide these procedural protections.
Other International Law Considerations
As noted at the outset of this discussion on international law 
and practice, there is little explicit guidance in international 
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law with respect to abandonment decisions; not all countries 
even have such procedures. However, there is much broad-
er international jurisprudence on “manifestly unfounded” 
claims. While in Canada, the statutory framework separ-
ates abandonment determination from the determination 
of whether a claim is manifestly unfounded, in practice the 
result is identical: an expedited removal process with no ac-
cess to subsequent risk assessments.41 In some limited sense, 
an abandonment decision can be seen as a “manifestly un-
founded” decision in a diff erent guise.42 It is therefore in-
structive that even “fraudulent applications” (which form 
a subset of UNHCR’s defi nition of manifestly unfounded 
refugee claims) should be accorded procedural protections, 
including the right to an oral hearing.43 Th is suggests that 
determinations of abandonment, which are made without al-
leging fraud, should accord the claimants similar procedural 
protections.
Domestic Legislative Framework
Th e jurisprudence on abandonment has built up over a sig-
nifi cant period of time. As a result, both the current and 
previous legislative frameworks must be reviewed. Th e 
Immigration Act44 was the governing statute for refugee 
protection in Canada from 1978 to 28 June 2002.45 Th e 
Convention Refugee Determination Division (CRDD) of the 
Immigration and Refugee Board had jurisdiction over the de-
termination of refugee claims in Canada—and consequently 
the abandonment of refugee claims—between its establish-
ment in 199346 and 27 June 2002. Since 28 June 2002, under 
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act47 (IRPA), the 
Refugee Protection Division of the Board has had jurisdic-
tion over refugee claims and their abandonment.
Th e decision by the Board, under both the Immigration 
Act and the IRPA, to declare a refugee claim to be abandoned 
is a fi nal decision. A valid abandonment decision causes the 
Board to become functus offi  cio over the refugee claim as it 
represents the fi nal disposition of the claim. Under both the 
Immigration Act and the IRPA, a declaration of abandon-
ment by the Board has severe consequences for a claimant. A 
conditional removal order (which is typically issued shortly 
aft er a claimant makes a refugee claim) becomes eff ective 
upon the abandonment of the claim by the Board and the 
notifi cation thereof of the claimant.48 Under the IRPA, an 
abandonment decision can have the further eff ect of barring 
the claimant from being eligible to seek refugee or other pro-
tection in Canada in the future.49
Immigration Act provisions relating to 
 abandonment
Under s. 69.1(6) of the Immigration Act the CRDD had the 
discretionary power to declare a refugee claim to be aban-
doned. Th e two condition precedents to the exercise of this 
power were (i) the default of the claimant in the prosecution 
of the refugee claim, and (ii) the provision to the claimant of 
a “reasonable opportunity to be heard” on issue of abandon-
ment.50
Th e Immigration Act defi ned the fi rst condition precedent 
to abandonment as any of the following: the failure to ap-
pear for a hearing,51 the failure to fi le a completed Personal 
Information Form (PIF),52 and “in the opinion of the 
Division” being “otherwise in default in the prosecution of 
the claim.”53
As a matter of practice, the CRDD considered the failure 
to provide a PIF within the prescribed time period (from 28 
to 42 days depending on the methods of service and fi ling54) 
as being “otherwise in default in the prosecution of the claim.” 
In her practice notice55 on the subject, the Chairperson of 
the Board advised counsel that “[i]f a PIF is not fi led within 
the prescribed time, a notice to appear for a show cause hear-
ing will be issued.”56
Th e second condition precedent for the abandonment of 
a refugee claim under the Immigration Act was the provision 
to the claimant of a “reasonable opportunity to be heard.”57 
While a “reasonable opportunity” was not defi ned in the 
Immigration Act, Rule 32 of the CRDD Rules provided some 
guidance on the matter. Rule 32(1) required service of a no-
tice of an abandonment hearing. Th us, at a very minimum 
the Board was required to hold a hearing on the subject and 
to notify the claimant of this hearing.58
Th e Immigration Act did not explicitly state the circum-
stances under which the CRDD should abandon a refugee 
claim. Th e power to abandon was a discretionary power. 
However, the Immigration Act did provide guidance to the 
CRDD concerning the general principles of its operation. 
Section 68(2) of the Immigration Act requires the CRDD to 
“deal with all proceedings before it as informally and exped-
itiously as the circumstances and the considerations of fair-
ness permit.”
Echoing this mandate, the CRDD Rules allowed the 
CRDD to “take whatever measures are necessary … to dis-
pose of the matter expeditiously”59 and to allow a party to 
remedy non-compliance only where “the proceeding will 
not be unreasonably impeded.”60 However, neither of these 
provisions allowed the CRDD to waive a hearing concern-
ing an abandonment decision before declaring a claim to be 
abandoned.
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act  provisions 
relating to abandonment
While the Immigration Act provided a framework for aban-
donment particular to refugee claimants, the IRPA provides a 
general framework for abandonment governing all divisions 
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of the Board, including the RPD.61 Once again, the power to 
abandon is discretionary.
Section 168(1) of the IRPA allows any division of the Board 
to abandon a matter “if the Division is of the opinion that the 
applicant is in default in the proceedings.” While the IRPA in 
its statutory provisions for abandonment does not, unlike the 
Immigration Act, explicitly require that a refugee claimant be 
provided with a reasonable opportunity to be heard concern-
ing the abandonment, other provisions of the IRPA and the 
Refugee Protection Division Rules (the RPD Rules) do set out 
such a requirement in most cases.
Being in “default in the proceedings” is defi ned by s. 168(1) 
of the IRPA as including situations where (i) a claimant fails 
to appear for a hearing, (ii) a claimant fails to provide infor-
mation required by the RPD, or (iii) a claimant fails to com-
municate with the RPD aft er being requested to do so.
With respect to the failure to provide required informa-
tion, the RPD Rules distinguish “information” from “docu-
ments.”62 Th us the failure to provide required information 
may lead to abandonment but the failure to provide required 
documents may only lead to abandonment if it leads to the 
RPD making the further conclusion that the claimant is “in 
default of the proceedings.” Required information includes 
(i) the claimant’s contact information,63 and (ii) counsel’s 
contact information.64 Arguably, as the PIF is described as a 
document in the RPD Rules65 (as opposed to as a set of infor-
mation in the CRDD Rules66), failure to fi le a PIF simpliciter 
cannot provoke an abandonment decision; there must be a 
concomitant fi nding of “default in the proceedings.”
With respect to failure to communicate with the RPD, the 
RPD Rules (as noted above) do require certain notifi cations 
of information to be provided by the claimant to the RPD. 
However, the term “request” in s. 168(1) suggests a claimant-
specifi c non-universal communication67 which would pre-
clude universally required notifi cations. Furthermore, as the 
failure is defi ned as one of “communication,” it would appear 
that the defi ciency concerns the act (or failure thereof), and 
not the content, of communication.
Although specifi ed in the defi nition of being in “default 
of the proceedings,” these three instances do not provide an 
exhaustive defi nition of being in default. In addition to these 
instances, the Commentaries on the RPD Rules warns that 
where a claimant “is not prepared to proceed, the Division 
may determine that the proceeding before it has been aban-
doned.” Th us being unprepared (or more likely unwilling) 
to proceed would also be considered as being explicitly in 
default of the proceedings. As with the Immigration Act, the 
lists of defaults that may lead to abandonment set out in the 
IRPA should not be seen as exhaustive. Clearly, the RPD re-
tains the ability to fi nd other circumstances as being indica-
tive of default.
Th e abandonment provisions of the IRPA do not ex-
plicitly provide for a reasonable opportunity to be heard 
prior to abandonment. However, s. 170(b) of the IRPA does 
require the RPD to hold a hearing in “any matter before it.” 
Consequently, it can be inferred that even a matter destined 
for abandonment is guaranteed a hearing on the subject. 
However, as obvious as this might seem, a problematic ex-
ception to this rule is set out in the RPD Rules. Th is exception 
is discussed further below.
However, dealing fi rst with the rule in general before con-
sidering the exception, s. 170 of the IRPA requires (i) that the 
RPD must hold a hearing “in any proceeding before it”; (ii) 
must notify the claimant of the hearing; and, (iii) must give the 
claimant “a reasonable opportunity to present evidence, ques-
tion witnesses and make representations” at the hearing.68 In 
addition, the RPD Rules require that, with the exception noted 
below, the claimant be provided with an “opportunity to explain 
why the claim should not be declared abandoned.”69 Unlike 
the CRDD Rules, the RPD Rules do not require prior written 
notifi cation of the claimant where the claimant is present and 
it would be fair to proceed without written notice.70
Th e exception to the requirement in the RPD Rules to give 
a claimant a reasonable opportunity to be heard is where 
the claimant has failed to advise the Board, the Minister, or 
counsel of his or her whereabouts.71 In such a case, under 
Rule 58(1), the RPD is not required to hold an abandonment 
hearing. Indeed, according to this rule, the RPD is not re-
quired to give the claimant any opportunity to explain why 
the claim should not be declared abandoned.
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to exhaust-
ively examine the subject, it would appear that Rule 58(1) of 
the RPD Rules is void insofar as it is ultra vires the rule-mak-
ing powers conferred upon the Chairperson of the Board. 
Th is analysis is based upon the following factors: (i) Rule 
58(1) improperly qualifi es a statutory right; (ii) the statu-
tory right in question is not ambiguous; (iii) any other inter-
pretation would infringe unduly upon the rights of refugee 
claimants; and (iv) any other interpretation would infringe 
on the construction of the statute required by its domestic 
and international legal context. Th e impact of each of these 
factors upon the conclusion that Rule 58(1) is ultra vires is 
discussed in sequence below.
Firstly, Rule 58(1) is ultra vires insofar as it improperly 
qualifi es a statutory right. Th e rule in question clearly infrin-
ges upon s. 170(b) which requires a mandatory hearing in 
all refugee proceedings. In addition, the rule also infringes 
upon subsections 170(c) and (e) which require notice of a 
hearing and the right to make representations (at a hearing 
or otherwise).
Th e RPD Rules are made under the power of s. 161 of the 
IRPA. In subject matter, the rule in question falls within the 
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scope of s. 161(1)(b) (and also s. 161(1)(d)72). However, as 
a delegated instrument, it cannot exceed the authority of 
its parent statute.73 In this case the statute clearly lays out 
a scheme of mandatory hearings in all refugee matters. 
Furthermore, unlike other statutory schemes, there is no ex-
plicit power conferred to the Chairperson to make rules al-
lowing for exceptions to the statutory scheme.74 As stated by 
Dussault and Borgeat, a regulation exceeds the authority of 
its authorizing statute insofar as it authorizes “administrative 
discrimination”:
However, the criteria for discrimination [of human rights legis-
lation] set out in these provisions are not the only ones that 
are subject to judicial supervision insofar as the exercise of a 
regulation-making power is concerned. Indeed, the courts oft en 
consider that Parliament alone must possess this delicate power 
which consists in disadvantaging one category of citizens in re-
lation to another.75
Unauthorized discriminatory regulatory provisions—in 
the neutral sense of “discriminatory” used above—have been 
struck down by the courts.76 Th e rule in question exceeds 
the authority delegated to the Chairperson insofar as it is 
discriminatory; moreover the discrimination in question 
improperly qualifi es the rights guaranteed in the statutory 
scheme. As a result, the rule in question is quite likely ultra 
vires.
Secondly, there is no ambiguity in the IRPA surround-
ing Parliament’s desire to guarantee a hearing to all refugee 
claimants. If anything, the French-language version of s. 
170(b) is even stronger than the English-language version.77 
Th e signifi cance of s. 170(b) is reinforced both by the ab-
sence of a similar provision guaranteeing hearings in rela-
tion to the other divisions of the Board78 and also by the 
absence of a similarly clear and unambiguous provision 
guaranteeing a hearing in the Immigration Act.79 A similar 
provision guaranteeing hearings was also included in the 
Government’s previously proposed legislation on refugee 
claims that died on the order paper with the end of the 36th 
session of Parliament.80 Even the regulatory statement ac-
companying the prepublication of the RPD Rules provides 
no justifi cation or explanation of Rule 58(1).81 Th e lack of 
ambiguity in the statutory scheme requiring hearings in 
matters before the RPD undermines any broad interpreta-
tion of the Chairperson’s power to make rules making ex-
ceptions from the provisions of the statute.
Th irdly, to construe the IRPA otherwise would be to un-
duly encroach upon the right of a refugee claimant to a hear-
ing. As stated in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes 
(12th ed., 1969, at pages 251–52) and quoted with approval 
in Leiriao v. Val-Bélair (Town)82:
Statutes which encroach on the rights of the subject, whether as 
regards person or property, are subject to a strict construction 
in the same way as penal Acts. It is a recognized rule that they 
should be interpreted, if possible, so as to respect such rights, 
and if there is any ambiguity the construction which is in favour 
of the freedom of the individual should be adopted.
Th is approach has been previously applied by the Supreme 
Court of Canada to refugee determination.83 Th us any pos-
sible (unseen) ambiguity in the statute and regulations should 
be interpreted to protect a claimant from being deprived of 
his or her right to a hearing.
Fourthly, any interpretation should also be in keeping 
with the domestic and international framework of refugee 
protection. Section 3(2) specifi cally deals with the objectives 
of the IRPA in relation to refugee protection. Th ese object-
ives include the following: (i) “to fulfi l Canada’s international 
legal obligations with respect to refugees”, (ii) “to grant … fair 
consideration to those who come to Canada claiming per-
secution”, and (iii) “to establish fair and effi  cient procedures 
that will maintain the integrity of the Canadian refugee pro-
tection system.”84 None of these purposes, except with a very 
oblique reading, is contemplative of establishing special pro-
cedures to deal with uncooperative refugee claimants. While 
the objectives do speak of “expediency” as an objective, the 
jurisprudence is clear that fairness has priority over expedi-
ency as a goal when assessing the exercise of discretionary 
power; a similar priority should apply to the interpretation 
of statutory objectives.
Furthermore, there is a broader domestic legal context 
within which to consider the provisions of the IRPA and the 
RPD Rules. Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms is relevant insofar as it requires that certain actions 
are in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice; 
the right to a fair hearing provision of s. 2(e) of the Canadian 
Bill of Rights85 also provides for the right to a fair hearing in 
accordance with those same principles of fundamental jus-
tice.
With respect to the Charter, the jurisprudence indicates 
that inland refugee determination engages s. 7 of the Charter 
and therefore must be in keeping with the “principles of 
fundamental justice.”86 Baker87 (and later Suresh88) set out 
a context driven approach to the determination of proced-
ural safeguards. Following this approach, the important and 
fi nal nature of a decision to abandon a refugee claim as well 
as the clearly judicial nature of the RPD’s activities suggest 
a high level of procedural protection, including the right to 
an oral hearing or the right to make representations. While 
the jurisprudence has recently allowed for less than an oral 
hearing, notably in both Baker and Suresh (above), the pro-
cesses in question in those cases were not directly related to 
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refugee determination, administratively structured, discre-
tionary, and based upon policy considerations. Th e refugee 
determination process does not possess any of these features, 
which may mitigate in favour of less than the right to a full 
oral hearing.
With respect to the Canadian Bill of Rights, although of 
less import since the adoption of the Charter, the jurispru-
dence indicates that s. 2(e) guarantees the following min-
imum standard of conduct by a quasi-judicial body:
Under s. 2(e) of the Bill of Rights no law of Canada shall be con-
strued or applied so as to deprive him of “a fair hearing in ac-
cordance with the principles of fundamental justice”. Without 
attempting to formulate any fi nal defi nition of those words, I 
would take them to mean, generally, that the tribunal which ad-
judicates upon his rights must act fairly, in good faith, without 
bias and in a judicial temper, and must give to him the opportun-
ity adequately to state his case.89
Th e international legal context of Canada’s refugee deter-
mination system is, as acknowledged in the stated purposes of 
the IRPA quoted above, that the IRPA seeks to implement the 
obligations towards refugees recognized under international 
law. As noted in both Baker and Suresh (above) and as stated 
previously by the Supreme Court of Canada in National Corn 
Growers Assn. v. Canada (Import Tribunal)90:
… [I]n circumstances where the domestic legislation is unclear 
it is reasonable to examine any underlying international agree-
ment. In interpreting legislation which has been enacted with a 
view towards implementing international obligations, as is the 
case here, it is reasonable for a tribunal to examine the domestic 
law in the context of the relevant agreement to clarify any uncer-
tainty. Indeed where the text of the domestic law lends itself to 
it, one should also strive to expound an interpretation which is 
consonant with the relevant international obligations.
As noted at the outset of this paper, in the discussion of 
the international legal framework of refugee determination, 
there is both a general acceptance of the right to due process, 
including an oral hearing, in refugee determination and a 
practical accordance of an oral hearing to refugee claimants.
In closing, concern about Rule 58(1) is not purely of theor-
etical concern. Indeed, it is possible to conceive of a situation 
(for example, involving a claimant with mental illness or a 
claimant who has simply traveled to a remote location for 
work) where counsel (and the Minister and the Board) may 
not know the contact information of the claimant but coun-
sel may have information or witnesses relevant to the issue 
of abandonment. In such a case, Rule 58(1) would allow the 
Board to dispense with a hearing notwithstanding its clear 
utility. It is also clear that there are groups of refugee claim-
ants, such as unaccompanied minors, who should seldom (if 
ever) be abandoned without some inquiry as to their circum-
stances.
Provisions such as Rule 58(1) erode the rights of refugee 
claimants. In the past, the jurisprudence has allowed the 
Board to assume a claimant had “implicitly waived” some 
rights in relation to abandonment proceedings; however 
such waivers have always been restricted to rights accorded 
by the Board’s rules and never statutory rights.91 It would 
be an ominous expansion of the scope of the Board’s power 
to allow it to deem statutory rights “implicitly waived” and 
thereby bypass statutory guarantees of a hearing.
Th e IRPA, like the Immigration Act, mandates that pro-
ceedings be dealt with as expeditiously as possible.92 However, 
unlike the CRDD Rules, the RPD Rules provide some guid-
ance concerning what information to consider when decid-
ing whether to abandon a claim. Th e RPD must consider (i) 
the explanations given by the claimant at the hearing, (ii) 
whether the claimant is ready to start or continue the pro-
ceedings, and (iii) any other relevant information.93 Th ese 
considerations are technically subject to waiver under Rule 
69 of the RPD Rules—although it is diffi  cult to imagine such 
a waiver.
Remedies to abandonment decision
Th ere are two courses of action available to a claimant seek-
ing to challenge the decision by the Board to abandon his 
or her refugee claim. A claimant may (i) apply for leave for 
judicial review with the Federal Court, and/or (ii) request by 
way of motion94 that the Board reopen its decision to declare 
the claim to be abandoned. Th ese remedies are independent 
of each other and may be pursued in sequence or in tandem. 
In both cases, given that an abandonment hearing involves 
fi ndings of both fact and law, if the reviewing body fi nds an 
error it should almost always grant relief.95 Th e result of both 
a successful judicial review (of an abandonment decision) 
and a successful motion to reopen should be the quashing 
of the declaration of abandonment and remittance either (i) 
to a new panel of the Board for a rehearing of the issue of 
abandonment, or (ii) to a new panel of the Board for a deter-
mination of the claimant’s refugee claim.96
Th e Immigration Act and the IRPA allow for judicial re-
view with the leave of the Federal Court of abandonment de-
cisions. An application for leave for judicial review must gen-
erally be initiated within fi ft een days of receipt by a claimant 
of the abandonment decision.97 Th e judicial review must be 
contemporaneous with the abandonment decision—and not 
any later conclusion of proceedings (with the exception of 
motions to reopen, discussed below).98 With the exception 
(discussed below) of extending the time limit for the fi ling of 
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the application, the Court will require strict adherence to the 
rules of court for claimants seeking to set aside abandonment 
decisions.99 Th e standard of review is correctness concerning 
issues of natural justice and procedural fairness and reason-
ableness simpliciter for all other issues.100
Unusually, the Court has shown a willingness to consider 
new evidence at the judicial review where the new evidence 
provides an exculpatory explanation for the alleged default 
in prosecution which resulted in abandonment and the new 
evidence was not previously available.101 Furthermore, the 
Court has also drawn negative inferences where such new 
evidence would be reasonably expected to be presented upon 
judicial review.102
Obviously, the rejection of a motion to reopen can also be 
the subject of judicial review.103
A limited body of jurisprudence indicates a willingness of 
the Federal Court to grant an extension of the deadline for 
fi ling for judicial review where the delay is directly a result of 
seeking redress through a motion to reopen before seeking 
judicial review of the underlying abandonment decision.104 
However, sequential judicial reviews of both an abandon-
ment decision and then a denial of a motion to reopen may 
be barred by the doctrine of res judicata.105
An alternative remedy is to apply by way of motion to the 
Board to set aside the abandonment decision and to reopen 
the claim. As at common law, only a valid abandonment 
decision causes the Board to become functus offi  cio, such a 
motion must challenge the validity of the Board’s decision. 
To do so, the motion should present evidence that was not 
previously before the Board indicating that the claimant was 
denied natural justice.106 Rule 55 of the RPD Rules codifi es 
this common-law rule by explicitly providing for a motion 
to re-open based upon the “failure to observe a principle of 
natural justice.”107
A motion to reopen must be fi led as quickly as possible 
with the Board. Any delay between the abandonment deci-
sion and the fi ling of a motion to reopen necessitates a clear 
and complete explanation.108 In addition, any default that 
can be remedied (for example, the failure to fi le a PIF) should 
be remedied as soon as possible and no later than the fi ling 
of the motion.109
Th e Board and the Courts have established that motions 
to reopen will be granted where they show the abandonment 
decision to have been contrary to the principles of natural 
justice.110 As the requirements of natural justice primarily 
relate to the right to receive a fair hearing, a motion will be 
most likely to succeed when it challenges an abandonment 
decision made in the absence of the claimant.
According to the CRDD Rules, the RPD Rules, and princi-
ples of natural justice, the Minister must be given an oppor-
tunity to respond to any motion.111 Although not explicitly 
stated in the jurisprudence or the relevant rules, the standard 
of review is proof on a balance of probabilities.112 Th e prin-
ciple of res judicata applies to motions to reopen; therefore, 
a claimant will generally only be entitled to consideration of 
one such motion.113
Th e most signifi cant disadvantage of a motion to reopen 
is that not only does it not bar removal pending the Board’s 
determination of the motion but also the courts have been 
hesitant to stay execution of a removal order where a motion 
to reopen is pending.114 However, the Board has exercised its 
jurisdiction to decide a motion where a claimant is outside 
of Canada115 and where a claimant has been deported and 
subsequently returned to Canada.116 Although the current 
practice of the Board is not to provide formal written rea-
sons explaining its determinations of motions to reopen, the 
Registrar of the Board does provide, upon request, a tran-
script of the (usually brief) “endorsement” that appears on 
the fi le justifying the decision.117
Jurisprudence
For a variety of reasons, not least of which is the fact that 
the IRPA has been in eff ect for a shorter period of time than 
the Immigration Act, most of the jurisprudence concerning 
the abandonment of refugee claims has been decided under 
the Immigration Act.118 As noted earlier, abandonment deci-
sions can be remedied through an application to the Board 
or through judicial review in the Federal Court. Although 
technically possible if a case before the Federal Court is cer-
tifi ed to concern a matter of “general importance,”119 there 
have been few decisions of the Federal Court of Appeal deal-
ing directly with abandonment.
Although both the Immigration Act and the IRPA are 
structured so as to allow the Board to expand the possible 
grounds for abandonment, in fact the jurisprudence appears 
to limit the grounds. Th e jurisprudence does not oft en stray 
beyond the defaults in prosecution explicitly defi ned in the 
statutes and limits even those defaults, as discussed below, 
by adding a required mental component. However, the juris-
prudence has relatively generously construed a claimant’s 
reasonable opportunity to be heard on the subject of aban-
donment. Th e decisions of the Board and the Federal Court 
will be discussed below insofar as they relate to both these 
elements of the abandonment scheme. Both the jurispru-
dence’s interpretation of the legislative framework’s defi n-
itions of “default in prosecution” and its understanding of the 
requirement that a claimant have a “reasonable opportunity 
to be heard” will be discussed in sequence below.
Default in Prosecution
A default in prosecution of a refugee claim provokes an aban-
donment hearing. Th e statutorily defi ned (under both the 
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Immigration Act and the IRPA) defaults (which are also the 
most common in the jurisprudence) are (i) failing to submit a 
PIF within the deadline, and (ii) failing to appear for a hearing. 
A third common default is a claimant’s deliberate refusal to 
proceed with the hearing of his or her claim by the Board.
As discussed below, in order to be suffi  cient for abandon-
ment any default must include not only the act constituting 
default but also an accompanying mental intention.120 Th e 
level of mental intention required includes not only wilful 
acts but also acts of wilful blindness. It is the lack of required 
mental intention which is the most common “defense” of-
fered at an abandonment hearing. Obviously, any such de-
fense only prevents abandonment if it is believed by the 
Board.121 Th e claimant bears the burden of proof. Th e third 
ground of default cited above (the refusal to proceed with 
the hearing of his or her claim) does not allow a claimant to 
bring into question whether the act is deliberate.
In assessing any default of prosecution of his or her refu-
gee claim, the Board must consider the matter holistically.122 
Th e history of the fi le, including delays and breaches of the 
rules attributable to the claimant, are appropriate matters 
for consideration by the Board.123 Th e Board has also con-
sidered the claimant’s actions before the referral of the claim 
to the Board.124 As stated by Nadon, J. (albeit in obiter dicta) 
in Kavunzu v. M.C.I.125:
It seems to me that the “default” has to be interpreted having 
regard to all the circumstances of the case, i.e., the date of the 
claimant’s arrival, whether or not a personal information form 
was fi led, whether or not counsel was retained in a timely man-
ner, one or more previous absences when directed to appear, etc. 
Th erefore, in my view, when a claimant fails to comply with an 
appearance date, the Refugee Division should have regard to all 
of the circumstances I have mentioned in deciding whether the 
claimant in the case before it “is otherwise in default in the pros-
ecution of the claim.”
Unfortunately, the Board does not need to consider these 
matters within the context of its own (relatively) slow pro-
cess.126 Also, the jurisprudence is at the very least silent, and 
likely opposed, to the consideration of the relative merits of 
the refugee claim in the holistic determination of whether 
there has been a default.127 On this point, a clearly well-
founded claim would seem to suggest that a (reasonable) 
claimant would not deliberately default in its prosecution—
thereby circumstantially corroborating the claimant’s prof-
fered explanation. However, the Board does not explicitly 
consider this in the jurisprudence as a corroborative factor 
in assessing the claimant’s explanation for default—although 
many of the Court’s and the Board’s decisions do seem to 
imply the converse.
While the Board can consider the matter holistically, the 
focus of abandonment proceedings is in the past actions (or 
inactions) of the claimant. A subsequent demonstrated will-
ingness to prosecute the claim (for example, on the occasion 
of the abandonment hearing) does not prevent the Board 
from declaring the claim to be abandoned.128 However, not-
withstanding that it does not prevent an abandonment deci-
sion, the Board must at least accurately consider the willing-
ness of a claimant to proceed with his or her claim at the 
abandonment hearing.129
Perhaps the most common default that leads to abandon-
ment proceedings is the failure by a claimant to fi le a com-
pleted PIF with the Board within the prescribed time per-
iod. As the PIF provides the Board with the claimant’s core 
biographical data and material allegations of risk, the default 
in the timely fi ling of the PIF is considered to be a serious 
default; extensions to the deadline for the fi ling of the PIF 
are only granted according to Board policy on an “excep-
tional” basis. In order to remedy a default in fi ling a PIF, the 
Board may grant an adjournment of the abandonment hear-
ing to allow the claimant to fi le a PIF before the resumption 
of proceedings.130 However, obviously a better practice is to 
ensure the PIF is fi led well before the abandonment hear-
ing—although this will not automatically vitiate the need for 
a hearing.
Th ere are two commonly cited reasons for the failure to 
fi le a PIF within the required time period: (i) the failure to re-
ceive the PIF, and (ii) diffi  culties in answering the questions 
contained within the PIF. Th ese reasons will be discussed in 
sequence below.
Firstly, a claimant’s failure to fi le a PIF may be explained 
by his or her failure to receive a PIF.131 Notwithstanding the 
Ministry’s notice to the Board that it has served the claimant 
with the PIF, it may not have been received by the claimant or 
it may have been received late.132 Although the CRDD Rules 
and RPD Rules allow for deemed service, the failure to receive 
a PIF provides an exculpatory explanation for failing to fi le 
the PIF within the prescribed time period. If a claimant pro-
vides uncontradicted evidence that he or she has not received 
a PIF, there is no reason to declare the claim abandoned.133 
In such a case, the default in question is not deliberate.
Secondly, a PIF may not have been fi led in a timely man-
ner because of diffi  culties in completing the PIF. However, 
any explanation off ered by a claimant for delay in fi ling the 
PIF must carefully account for the complete period of the 
delay.134 Diffi  culty in meeting with counsel or an interpreter, 
in the absence of evidence of no other alternative, is not a 
suffi  cient reason for delay (or at least a lengthy delay) in the 
fi ling of the PIF.135 Th e lack of receipt of disclosure from the 
Board or the Ministry is not an acceptable “diffi  culty” in fail-
ing to complete the PIF.136
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In keeping with its practice notice on the subject,137 the 
Board must consider any pending (perhaps post facto) re-
quests for an extension of the PIF deadline before declaring 
a claim to be abandoned.138 Obviously, the default (of fail-
ing to fi le before the deadline) is remedied if an extension is 
granted. Th e mere denial of a request to extend the PIF dead-
line (and a consequent failure to fi le the PIF by the deadline) 
cannot automatically result in the abandonment of the claim 
as the grounds for determining extension requests and for 
making abandonment decisions are diff erent.139
In relation to diffi  culties in completing the PIF attribut-
able to counsel, care must be taken to distinguish errors of 
counsel that result in a default from errors of counsel that 
deny a claimant a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the 
subject of abandonment. While, as discussed below, the lat-
ter have been found to vitiate an abandonment decision, the 
Board and the Courts have shown a less forgiving attitude to 
the former, oft en abandoning claims where delays or failures 
were due to the delays or negligence of counsel.140
Failing to attend a hearing as required by the Board can 
result also in the abandonment of a refugee claim. Th is is 
sometimes combined with the failure to fi le a PIF—as when 
a claimant commits the former, is ordered to appear for an 
abandonment hearing and then fails to attend the hearing. 
As noted above, in order for an abandonment to occur there 
must exist both the act of failing to attend the hearing and 
the intention of not pursuing the claim.141 Th ere may be an 
exculpatory reason for failing to attend a hearing. Once the 
Board has determined that the claimant has been notifi ed of 
the hearing in accordance with its procedures, the Board is 
entitled to presume from the claimant’s failure to attend that 
he or she is deliberately in default of prosecution of his or her 
refugee claim.142 However, where the claimant does attend 
for at least some of the hearing, this presumption is arguably 
rebutted.143
Th e commonly cited explanations for a claimant’s failure 
to appear include: (i) lack of knowledge of the hearing date; 
(ii) physical inability to attend; (iii) misunderstanding as to 
the hearing date; (iv) illness; and (v) unwillingness to pro-
ceed. Th ese reasons will be discussed in sequence below.
Firstly, the lack of awareness of a hearing dates provides a 
complete explanation for failing to appear. Th is explanation 
is to failing to attend a hearing what alleging a failure to re-
ceive the PIF is to failing to fi le a PIF. However, unlike service 
of the PIF, the Board is normally responsible for service of 
notice of hearing dates. Th e records of the Board will there-
fore normally establish that the Board notifi ed the claimant, 
at the very least, by post of the hearing date.144 To rebut this 
presumption of notice the claimant must provide credible 
evidence that he or she did not receive notice of the hearing 
through no fault of his or her own145 and establish that he 
or she was otherwise diligently prosecuting the claim.146 As 
a matter of credibility, where a claimant admits residing at 
the address of service and there is no evidence of the notice 
not having been delivered, it will be diffi  cult for the Board to 
accept the claimant’s evidence that he or she did not receive 
notice of the hearing.147
Obviously, if the claimant is in fact informed of the hear-
ing date by some other means an error by the Board in noti-
fying the claimant is irrelevant.148 Failing to receive a notice 
as a result of knowingly failing to advise the Board of his or 
her address is equally not an adequate excuse; a claimant who 
places himself in a position where communication is diffi  cult 
or non-existent cannot plead lack of knowledge of what was 
occurring for excusing delay or a failure to appear.149
Finally, a claimant may in some circumstances success-
fully rely upon the negligence of counsel to explain his or 
her alleged lack of knowledge of a hearing date. Th e impact 
of such negligence in abandonment decisions is discussed 
below under the topic of what constitutes a reasonable op-
portunity to be heard.
One possible reason for failing to attend a refugee hearing 
is a claimant’s misunderstanding of or forgetfulness of the 
date of the hearing. However, a bald assertion of a misunder-
standing about a hearing date or the requirement to attend 
is unlikely—absent a cogent explanation—to be accepted.150 
Language diffi  culties (and the lack of competent interpreta-
tion) can sometimes result in a genuine misunderstand-
ing.151 When such an explanation is proff ered, the Board can 
reasonably seek corroboration of the account through, for 
example, his or her account of contact with counsel.152
Th e impossibility of the claimant attending the offi  ce of 
the Board may provide an acceptable explanation for the 
claimant’s absence;153 mere diffi  culty or “logistical prob-
lems” in attending will not generally provide an acceptable 
explanation.154 However, in the face of repeated denials of 
a claimant’s request for a change of venue, a claimant’s con-
tinued failure to attend (despite practical impossibility) may 
well result in abandonment.155 Furthermore, while being in 
custody may provide an excuse for a claimant’s absence, fail-
ure to advise the Board of this fact (thereby preventing the 
Board from addressing this issue) may provide an independ-
ent reason for abandonment.156 Ultimately, in both the situa-
tion of a claimant in custody and the situation of a claimant 
quite distant from the Board’s offi  ce the rules of the Board 
(allowing for release from custody to attend a hearing and 
attendance at a hearing by teleconference) will prevent either 
explanation from being accepted indefi nitely.
Although similar to being physically unable to attend, 
medical illness is diff erent insofar as it is a phenomenon 
which the Board has no real ability to remedy. Medical ill-
ness is obviously a valid explanation for failing to attend a 
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hearing. As an event outside of the control of the claimant 
(or, where it is the illness of counsel, outside of the control 
of counsel), failure to appear as a result of infi rmity should 
not result in the abandonment of a refugee claim—although 
it is likely to provoke an abandonment hearing. In the case 
of such illness, the Board expects the claimant to present 
“clear, detailed and unequivocal documentation”157 of the 
illness.158 Any qualifi ed medical personnel providing such 
documentation should be aware of its use as an explanation 
for the claimant’s absence.159
At an abandonment hearing resulting from the claim-
ant’s illness, if the Board does not impeach the claimant’s 
(or counsel’s) evidence of illness the Board cannot declare 
the claim to be abandoned.160 Furthermore, lacking any 
medical expertise, the Board should not substitute its own 
opinion concerning the claimant’s medical condition for that 
of a qualifi ed medical practitioner treating the claimant.161 
However, the lack of medical evidence does leave it open to 
the Board to disbelieve that the claimant was ill.162 Any med-
ical evidence must not only establish illness, but also that the 
illness was serious enough to prevent the claimant from at-
tending the hearing.163
On occasion, a claimant does attend his or her hearing 
but advises the Board that he or she is unable or unwilling to 
proceed with the hearing. Although such an action may lead 
to the claimant removing himself or herself from the hear-
ing room (and thereby being in breach of the requirement to 
attend), the Board’s determination of abandonment usually 
correctly focuses on the underlying intention of the claimant 
not to proceed. Th e Board may treat such an action as evi-
dence of a default in the prosecution of the claim.
Th e most common explanation for such action is the lack 
of availability of counsel. While claimants have the right to 
counsel, this right is not absolute.164 Where a claimant refuses 
to proceed with qualifi ed counsel, delays in retaining coun-
sel, or retains unavailable counsel the Board may fi nd that 
the claimant has defaulted in the prosecution of the claim.165 
Th is is especially likely when a claimant retains new counsel 
at the last minute who is unable or unwilling to proceed.166 
With respect to delay, a delay as short as three weeks in re-
taining new counsel (when previous counsel was unavailable 
on the hearing date) has been found by the Board to indicate 
a lack of diligence in the prosecution of the claim.167
Reasonable Oppoortunity to Be Heard
Th e Board is generally required to hold a hearing on the 
subject of abandonment before declaring a claim to be aban-
doned. As always, the Board must advise the claimant of the 
hearing and must allow the claimant a reasonable opportun-
ity to address the issue at the hearing.168 Th e failure to pro-
vide a reasonable opportunity to be heard does not require 
a fi nding of deliberate fault; it can occur without the know-
ledge of Board (for example, due to postal or interpretation 
error).169 Furthermore, although in practice most breaches 
of a reasonable opportunity to be heard result in prejudice, 
prejudice is not a condition precedent to relief.170
Th e requirements of notice and an opportunity to be 
heard will be discussed in sequence below, along with other 
circumstances which (in the peculiar situation of an aban-
donment hearing) may lead to a denial of a reasonable op-
portunity to be heard.
Th e abandonment hearing is normally scheduled on a 
peremptory basis.171 As with other proceedings before the 
Board, and as discussed above under the heading of failure 
to appear, the Board must generally notify the claimant of 
abandonment proceedings. While under the CRDD Rules 
the required “notice” was defi ned in terms of written notice, 
even the new RPD Rules require a notice of some kind (in or-
der to make the proceedings “fair” under Rule 58(2)(a)). Th e 
potential exculpatory explanations cited above in relation to 
failing to attend a hearing generally apply to abandonment 
proceedings as well.
In order for the notice of the abandonment hearing to be 
meaningful, the claimant (and counsel) must understand 
the default in prosecution that is being alleged by the Board. 
Normally this is set out in the Notice to Appear for the aban-
donment hearing. Where the Notice to Appear mistakenly 
describes the default, the Board must issue a new notice or 
obtain the consent of the claimant (or counsel) to amend 
the defective notice.172 While the RPD Rules allow an aban-
donment proceeding to occur without written notice, the 
requirements of “fairness” would require that the Board ex-
plicitly inform the claimant and counsel of the default that is 
being considered.
Adjournments may be granted to obtain additional evi-
dence corroborating the claimant’s explanation for the al-
leged default. However, such adjournments are neither auto-
matic, nor without limit.173 Despite the relative urgency of 
abandonment proceedings, the record must not indicate 
a “too-rigid and too-rushed performance by the CRDD 
panel.”174 In other words, the Board must not schedule an 
abandonment hearing in undue haste or without heeding its 
own directives and practice on the scheduling or adjourn-
ment of hearings.175
As with any hearing, a claimant has the right to coun-
sel176 and the Board has an obligation to ensure that a guard-
ian ad litem (designated representative) is appointed for any 
legally incapable claimant.177 Th e claimant (or counsel on the 
claimant’s behalf) may make representations on the subject 
of abandonment and introduce evidence. Perhaps given the 
limited focus of the proceedings, where counsel is present but 
the claimant is absent the claimant can be said to have had a 
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reasonable opportunity to be heard.178 However, the Board’s 
failure to request or to consider evidence tendered or submis-
sions of counsel will prevent a party to an abandonment hear-
ing from having a reasonable opportunity to be heard.179
Th e law on natural justice and a reasonable opportunity 
to be heard in the context of refugee hearings generally ap-
plies to abandonment proceedings. It is unlikely that, where 
the circumstances are brought about or contributed to by the 
claimant, the Board or the Court will allow the claimant to 
rely upon them in order to gain relief.180 Although not an 
exhaustive list of possible defects, the abandonment juris-
prudence suggests three common breaches of a reasonable 
opportunity to be heard: (i) failures of counsel; (ii) interpret-
ation errors; and (iii) duress.
Firstly, defects in the actions of counsel can deny a claim-
ant the reasonable opportunity to be heard. In relation to the 
conduct of counsel, while the jurisprudence on the denial 
of a reasonable opportunity at an abandonment hearing is 
generally equivalent to the jurisprudence of denial of natural 
justice more generally, the severe consequences of an aban-
donment hearing have caused the Court and the Board to 
adopt a more forgiving (at least, for the rights of a claimant) 
approach to the failures of counsel.181
In order to breach the requirements of natural justice, 
the failure of counsel must be serious enough to “deny the 
applicant the opportunity of a hearing.”182 For example, the 
failure of counsel to advise the claimant of a hearing date—
especially an abandonment date—can deny a claimant a 
“reasonable opportunity to be heard.”183 In such a case, the 
claimant must have reasonably relied upon counsel184 and 
the failure of counsel should be unambiguous.185 However, 
where there is some shared fault on the part of the claim-
ant (for example, in failing to advise the Board of an address 
change or in ignoring a notice sent by the Board), the courts 
have been reluctant to grant relief.186
Secondly, interpretation errors can vitiate a claimant’s 
ability to present evidence and his or her right to understand 
the proceedings. Briefl y, although interpretation defects need 
not be shown to prejudice the claimant in an abandonment 
proceeding, it must be established that a complaint concern-
ing interpretation was made at the fi rst available opportun-
ity.187
Th irdly, duress can also vitiate a reasonable opportunity to 
be heard. Th e Federal Court of Appeal has held that where a 
person is not free to bring up facts, a reasonable opportunity 
to be heard has not been provided:
… that an immigration inquiry, held at a moment when the per-
son concerned was under the direct infl uence of a third party 
(her husband) and not free to bring up facts as they were, could 
be seen as having breached the rules of natural justice, with the 
result that the decision that followed was a nullity under the 
Charter and the adjudicator could reconsider his decision … 188
Of course, credibility is almost always a condition precedent 
to the establishment of duress.189
Conclusion
Th e abandonment of a refugee claim is an aspect of refu-
gee determination that has received little specifi c atten-
tion. However, given the seriousness of the consequences 
to the claimant and the general recognition of the danger 
of refoulement, due process guarantees should be strictly 
applied. In assessing the statutory structure under which 
abandonment decisions and the related jurisprudence are 
made, it would appear that the judiciary—if not the legisla-
tive or executive branches—have adopted a properly cau-
tious approach.
It must be always remembered that the power to aban-
don is a discretionary decision. Although the framework of 
abandonment is centred around an understanding of default 
and a reasonable opportunity to be heard, the core of the de-
cision is the Board’s exercise of its discretion. For example, 
while the jurisprudence deals with abandonment in terms of 
a required mental intention, an alternate method of analysis 
is that mental intention is not a necessary element of the de-
fault but rather a factor that mitigates in favour of the Board 
refusing to exercise its discretion to abandon a refugee claim 
notwithstanding a default. A similar argument can be made 
that some of the unusual cases regarding the defi nition of a 
reasonable opportunity to be heard can be better understood 
as instances where a reasonable opportunity was given but 
other circumstances mitigated against the exercise of discre-
tion.
Understanding the issue of abandonment as the exercise 
of discretion also places renewed focus on its boundaries: 
those imposed by the statute, the principles of the rule of law, 
the principles of administrative law, the fundamental values 
of Canadian society, and the principles of the Charter.190 Th e 
most signifi cant boundary in the case of refugee claims facing 
abandonment is the internationally accepted understanding 
that bona fi de refugees should never be refused protection, 
even if there has been non-compliance with various admin-
istrative rules. As the High Commissioner himself noted in a 
recent address to ExCom:
While UNHCR supports measures to combat misuse of asy-
lum systems, I am concerned that in some cases indiscriminate 
measures have led to non-admission, denial of access to asylum 
procedures, and even incidents of refoulement.191
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Ultimately it is this denial of access and danger of refoule-
ment that must inform abandonment proceedings and deci-
sions.
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